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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HAROLD ALMA LEFEVRE & 
EDITH K. LEFEVRE, 
Deceased. 
HAL LeFEVRE, JULIA RICHMOND, 
JEFFREY LeFEVRE, KELLY LeFEVRE, 
DANIEL LeFEVRE, BRYCE LeFEVRE, and 
CYNTHIA C. L. GILES, 
Petitioners/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
LELAND E. STOUT, 
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee. | 
Case No. 20080234 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The amended judgment was entered March 4, 2008. Stout filed his notice of appeal 
on March 5, 2008, and the LeFevre children timely filed their notice of cross-appeal on the 
attorney fee issue on March 20, 2008. 
The Order Granting Motion for Stay and Other Relief Upon Appeal was entered 
March 26,2008. The LeFevre children timely filed their notice of appeal on April 1, 2008. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying requested attorney fees? 
Standard of review. Upon review, an appellate court will review for correctness the 
issue of whether the case is a type for which attorney fees may be granted.l The related issue 
of the amount of fees, or whether to deny fees altogether, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.2 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting a stay to preserve the status 
quo pending appeal? 
Standard of review. Although the LeFevre children are correct that a court's 
interpretation of a rule is reviewed for correctness, the ultimate decision whether to grant a 
stay is vested in the discretion of the court and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The LeFevre children cross-appealed on two issues: the failure to award attorney fees, 
and the grant of a stay pending appeal. The denial of attorney fees was within the discretion 
"Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
2Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Bailey-Allen is 
apparently correct, then, that [a code section] endows the trial court with discretion in 
awarding attorney fees. We must therefore determine whether the trial court's denial of 
those fees constituted an abuse of discretion."); Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. 
Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Determination of such fees is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned unless there is a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion."). 
3Utah R. App. P. 62(a); In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, f 16, 48 P.3d 881. 
2 
of the trial court. In addition, the statutes relied on by the LeFevre children do not support 
an award of attorney fees in this case. 
The stay pending appeal just preserved the status quo pending appeal. Although the 
judgment was self-executing, the stay did not counteract the judgment, but only prevented 
transfers of title or changes in possession during the appeal. This was well within the 
discretion of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE LeFEVRE CHILDREN DID NOT ALLEGE NOR 
ESTABLISH THE REQUIREMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST; THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THEM TITLE 
TO THE HOME. 
In Rowlings v. Rawlings,4 which was decided after Stout's initial brief but prior to the 
LeFevre children's brief, this Court clarified the law regarding constructive trusts and 
explained the critical distinction of express constructive trusts and equitable constructive 
trusts. The trial court awarded the house to the LeFevre children using broad equitable 
constructive trust language, but the facts do not support that award. The facts here are more 
consistent with an express equitable trust, but again the facts do not support such an award. 
The LeFevre children failed to address the distinction between express constructive trusts and 
equitable constructive trusts. Also, the LeFevre children dismiss in only footnotes the issues 
of: (1) even if the constructive trust theory was proper, did the trial court err by awarding the 
home to the LeFevre children without requiring an adjustment for the increased equity of 
42008 UT App 478, 200 P.3d 662. 
3 
home caused by the title-holder discharging the mortgage against the house; and (2) in a 
probate matter, did the trial court err by awarding the house directly to the LeFevre children 
instead of treating it as an asset of the probate estate. 
As articulated in Stout's initial brief, the trial court erroneously awarded the property 
to the the LeFevre children through a constructive trust theory. In support of the trial court's 
decision, the LeFevre children contend that the trial court properly held a constructive trust 
arose as a matter of law in order to remedy an inequity. Under this theory of an equitable 
constructive trust, the LeFevre children contend Ellen Stout LeFevre committed a fraudulent 
act against them, she also violated her duties under a confidential relationship, and, as a 
consequence, she and Stout were unjustly enriched. Even if the trial court was correct in 
using the constructive trust theory, the LeFevre children fail to address the proper 
constructive trust theory at issue in our case, an express constructive trust. Furthermore, 
although the LeFevre children cite to several types of confidential or fiduciary relationships, 
they fail to address the missing evidence of superior influence necessary in a finding of a 
confidential relationship. 
A. The LeFevre Children's Failure to Properly Plead a Constructive Trust 
Should Have Barred the Trial Court's Award to Them Under that Theory. 
The LeFevre children acknowledge they did not plead a constructive trust, but argue 
they alleged the facts on which the constructive trust was based.5 But, neither their petition 
nor their brief allege the necessary elements of either type of constructive trust. And, at 
5Appellees' brief at 15. 
4 
times, the LeFevre children's brief cites case law based on the completely different legal 
theory of equitable estoppel.6 Stout does not dispute the trial court's inherent power to create 
constructive trusts when pled by a petitioner. However, the LeFevre children fail to cite any 
case law that supports the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust when a petitioner 
never pled a constructive trust theory. 
The LeFevre children did not plead constructive trust as a cause of action. Instead, 
the LeFevre children filed a petition to "set aside" the personal representative actions of Ellen 
as they concerned the transfer of the home from the probate estate of Harold LeFevre to 
Ellen's trust. In fact, on the morning of the trial, the trial court judge denied the LeFevre 
children's motion to amend their pleadings to add a claim of constructive trust to their causes 
of action. Based on the trial court's denial, there was no argument and no evidence presented 
at trial for the purpose of proving or disproving the validity of a constructive trust theory in 
this matter. 
Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to award a judgment based on the 
constructive trust theory that was never pled by the LeFevre children. 
B. Even if the Trial Court's Consideration of the Constructive Trust Theory was 
Proper, the Trial Court Should Have Used the Express Constructive Trust 
Analysis, Not the Equitable Constructive Trust Analysis. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court held the home belongs solely to the LeFevre 
children "pursuant to equity, fairness and to effect the intent of Harold and Ellen at the time 
6Appellee's brief at 13; Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 678 
(UtahCtApp. 1990). 
5 
of Harold's death."7 The trial court's conclusion blurs the distinction between two separate 
theories of constructive trusts, express and equitable. The LeFevre children's failure to plead 
a constructive trust, as explained above, has created a record void of any argument 
articulating the proper constructive trust analysis. 
As explained by this Court in Rowlings, "an express trust is a fiduciary relationship 
with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to create it and 
subjecting the person in whom title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit 
of others."8 In other words, this type of constructive trust allows the enforcement of an 
express trust that would not otherwise be enforceable. This Court further explained that 
"when no written instrument evidences a trust involving real property, the trust is enforceable 
only in limited circumstances."9 The critical elements of an express trust require evidence 
that (1) a confidential relationship existed between the grantor and the grantee at the time the 
grantor transferred the property to the grantee, and (2) the grantor intended to transfer 
ownership of the property to the grantee in trust for the benefit of a third-party.10 
In contrast, an equitable constructive trust "creates and imposes a trust in equity to 
avoid the unjust enrichment of one who has committed some wrongful act."11 The Utah 
7Recordll75Tf4. 
*Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ^  14 (quoting Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 
1987) (emphasis added)). 
9Id. atf 15 (citations omitted). 
l0See id. at % 12; see also Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151. 
nRawlings, 2008 UT App 478 at 113. 
6 
Supreme Court further explained that an equitable constructive trust arises "as a matter of 
equity where there has been (1) a wrongful act, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) specific 
property that can be traced to the wrongful behavior."12 
In Rawlings, a father conveyed property to one of his sons and the son's wife (the 
Grantees). The siblings claimed the father's intent was that the Grantees were to hold the 
property in trust for the benefit of all the siblings; the Grantees claimed their title was 
absolute. The trial court sided with the siblings, using, as in the instant case, general 
equitable principles. This Court reversed, holding the dispute should have been analyzed 
under the express constructive trust theory because the siblings' argument was that the father 
expressly intended the property to be shared by all his children. Furthermore, this Court held 
as a matter of law that there was no express trust because there was no evidence the father 
intended to transfer the property into a trust. 
Although there is evidence here that Ellen intended to (and did) transfer the property 
into a trust, establishing an express constructive trust also requires proof of a confidential 
relationship.13 The discussion in the following subpoint shows there was no confidential 
relationship between Ellen and her adult, nonresident step-children. 
Where the element of an express constructive trust were not satisfied, general 
equitable principles cannot fill the void. "The law governing the enforcement of express 
trusts is clear and must be applied even when it produces results that, under a pure fairness 
nWilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39,134, 164 P.3d 353. 
l3Rawlings,<l 15. 
7 
standard, might arguably be deemed inequitable."14 The trial court's grant of a constructive 
trust must be reversed. 
C. There Are No Facts Establishing a Confidential Relationship. 
As one of the requirements to show an express constructive trust, the facts must 
establish that Ellen was in a confidential relationship with the the LeFevre children. 
Although the trial court concluded there was a confidential relationship, there is no evidence 
justifying such a conclusion. At best, the findings below show that Ellen and the LeFevre 
children had a "good relationship."15 
As articulated in Stout's initial brief, a kinship or relationship is not in itself sufficient 
to show a confidential relationship. Rather, "there must be a showing, in addition to the 
kinship, a reposal of confidence by one party and the resulting superiority and influence on 
the other party."16 The LeFevre children's brief fails to address this critical element of 
showing a confidential relationship. Instead, the LeFevre children's brief merely restates 
types of legally recognized confidential relationships without providing any of the necessary 
legal tests and analysis to support the trial court's finding of a confidential relationship in this 
case. 
The cases and relationships argued by the LeFevre children do not apply. Stout does 
not dispute that there may be fiduciary duties between a personal representative and the 
14Id. at^ f 18 (citations omitted). 
15Record ll751f 37. 
l6In re Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). 
8 
creditors and heirs, or between a trustee and beneficiary, but none of those relationships 
existed at the time of the alleged agreement in this case. At the time of the meeting after 
Harold's death, the only relationship between Ellen and the LeFevre children was that of 
step-mother and adult, non-resident, step-children. The LeFevre children claim the terms of 
the trust later created were different than agreed at that meeting, but in creating or modifying 
the terms of the trust, Ellen was the trustor of the trust. The LeFevre children have cited to 
no law establishing a confidential relationship as a matter of law between a trustor and 
prospective beneficiaries. They make no claim of violation of her duties as trustee - the 
evidence was that she conveyed the property in accordance with the terms of the trust. The 
LeFevre children's complaint was that Ellen wrongfully amended the trust, which was an act 
as trustor, not trustee. 
Once again, the fact a constructive trust theory was never pled or argued by the 
LeFevre children makes it impossible for the trial court to have concluded there was in fact 
an express constructive trust. In our case, the LeFevre children's argument in support of a 
constructive trust rests on the legal conclusion that Ellen had a confidential relationship with 
the LeFevre children. As stated in Stout's initial brief, the findings in this case do not 
support such a conclusion. There simply is no proof that Ellen held superior influence over 
the the LeFevre children, and this Court should reverse the conclusion that a confidential 
relationship existed. 
9 
II: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE LeFEVRE CHILDREN AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
The trial court's conclusion that "each party shall pay their own attorney fees"17 is 
within the discretion of the trial court. Under Utah law, attorney fees "are awarded only as 
a matter of right under a contract or statute."18 Section 75-1-310 of the Utah Code does not 
provide for any award of attorney fees. Rather, the statute clearly states, "the court... may, 
in its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of 
the estate as justice may require."19 The LeFevre children were already awarded their costs 
by the trial court.20 
The LeFevre children cite to no authority supporting their argument that this statute 
mandates an award of attorney fees in addition to costs. In the one Utah21 case to address this 
statute, Grindstaffv. Sheville (In re Sheville)21 the party claiming attorney fees apparently 
relied on this statute only to support an award of costs.23 The court did not allow costs under 
17Record 11731J 15. 
"Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2,171, 201 P.3d 966 (citation omitted). 
19Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310 (2009) (emphasis added). 
20Recordll731Jl4. 
21This statute is not part of the Uniform Probate Code, so it is unlikely other courts 
would have opined on this statute. 
222003 UT App 141, 71 P.3d 179. 
23Id.^3. 
10 
the statute because the claim was raised for the first time on appeal.24 The award of attorney 
fees discussed in that case was based on a separate statute relating to bad faith litigation.25 
Similarly, the LeFevre children's claim under Utah Code § 75-3-719 is belied by the 
express terms of the statute. The statute is explicitly limited to a "personal representative" 
or a "person nominated as personal representative." As the LeFevre children state, no 
successor personal representative has been appointed to oversee Harold's estate. 
Furthermore, the implied "nomination" of Hal LeFevre to be the personal representative of 
Harold's estate has never been formally recognized. And, the LeFevre children's action does 
not come on behalf of Harold's estate; rather, the LeFevre children complaint was brought 
by the individually named children of Harold, not his estate. 
Even if Hal LeFevre had been appointed personal representative, the statute would 
only authorize an award of attorney fees "from the estate," not from Stout. 
Accordingly, the LeFevre children's claim to have their attorney fees paid by Harold's 
estate under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 must be denied. 
Ill: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING STOUT A 
STAY PENDING APPEAL. 
As the LeFevre children acknowledge, the issue of the stay pending appeal is now 
moot. Due to the trial court's order granting Stout's motion for a stay of execution on the 
24Id. 
25Id.<h4. 
11 
judgment, determining the appropriateness of the stay pending appeal at this appellate stage 
is effectively moot. 
Even if this Court decides to address this issue under the theory of "capable of 
repetition yet evading review," the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides clear guidelines 
supporting the trial court's granting of the stay in this case. Rule 62(d) authorizes a stay, 
"unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules."26 The LeFevre children 
claim that a stay is prohibited, basing their arguments on In re Grant,21 a 1914 decision 
issued before the current rules of appellate procedure were adopted. The case does not 
represent current Utah law on a stay pending appeal. 
Grant held that a stay would not lie from a "self-executing" judgment. In reaching 
that conclusion, the court relied on an Indiana attorney disbarment case, Walls v. Palmer}* 
The Utah court noted that an appeal from an order of disbarment would not reinstate the 
attorney pending the appeal.29 Although that may have been the law in Utah in 1914, it is not 
the current law. In In re Discipline of Johnson™ the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
5
 Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). 
744 Utah 386, 140 P. 226 (1914). 
*64Ind. 493 (1878). 
'Grant, HOP. at228. 
>2001UT110,48P.3d881. 
12 
disbarred lawyer "should be entitled to a stay of judgment pending appeal" unless there is "a 
substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public."31 
Rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: "When an appeal is taken, the 
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise 
prohibited by law or these rules." Leland Stout posted a bond and is therefore entitled to a 
stay. Nothing in the rules prohibits a stay, and the 1914 case relief upon by the LeFevre 
children is no longer the law in Utah. 
In addition, the stay does not invalidate the judgment. If title has already transferred, 
as argued by the the LeFevre children, then the effect of the stay is to prohibit the LeFevre 
children from making a further transfer. This is necessary to preserve the status quo pending 
appeal. Thus, if Stout prevails on appeal, there will be no intervening third-party rights to 
prevent returning the parties to their original positions. 
The LeFevre children fail to cite any case law prohibiting a stay pending appeal after 
a trial court's judgment gives title to an opposing party. Instead, Utah case law encourages 
an appellant to obtain the protection of a stay when seeking to overturn a trial court's 
judgment awarding title to an appellee.32 As articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, if an 
appellant fails to obtain a stay and the appellee subsequently sells the property to a third-
party, "an appeal is moot if possession or ownership of specific property which is 
3lId.^ 17. 
32See Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 (Utah 1996); see also Taylor v. Rosillo, 2002 
UT App 199 (memorandum decision). 
13 
inextricably involved in the relief being sought on appeal has been conveyed to third 
parties."33 In other words, an appellant must necessarily obtain a stay pending appeal in order 
to protect his rights to possession and ownership of a piece of property. 
Here, the trial court wisely granted Stout's motion to stay the LeFevre children' 
possession of the property until the resolution of this appeal. Stout's defense and appeal in 
this matter is directly tied to determining the rightful possession and ownership of the home. 
If, as Stout anticipates, this Court rules in his favor and reverses the trial court's decision, 
allowing Stout to keep the home, Stout would have been irreconcilably harmed if the 
LeFevre children had been able to sell the home in the interim and force Stout's family to 
leave the home. The LeFevre children have not been wrongfully deprived of their ability to 
protect their interest in the home because the laws necessarily protect the Stout's right to 
appeal the trial court's judgment below. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's finding that the LeFevre children are the 
rightful owners of the home under a constructive trust. Furthermore, the undisputed facts 
provide sufficient grounds to award judgment in favor of Stout. Alternatively, this case 
should be remanded for additional findings and reconsideration in light of those findings. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision that each party pay their own 
sRichards, 914 P.2d at 721 (citation and quotation omitted). 
14 
attorney fees. This Court should also affirm the trial court's decision to grant a stay pending 
appeal. 
DATED this £^fday of March, 2009. 
DON R. PETERSEN, 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and 
RICHARD L. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Leland Stout 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this z^* day of March, 2009. 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Jessica Anderson 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
4844 North 300 West STE 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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ADDENDUM 
Order Granting Motion for Stay and Other Relief Upon Appeal, entered March 26,2008 
F I L E D 
':: 2008 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), and 
RICHARD L. PETERSEN (9494), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Respondent Leland E. Stout 
Our File No. 28035-1 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF, 
HAROLD ALMA LEFEVRE and 
EDITH K. LEFEVRE, 
Deceased. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
i FOR STAY AND OTHER 
RELIEF UPON APPEAL 
Case No. 933400210 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Division #4 
Respondent Leland E. Stout's Motion for Stay and Other Relief Upon Appeal is hereby 
granted, and the Court now enters the following order: 
1. The Court hereby orders a stay of the execution of the judgment entered in this matter. 
2. All parties in this matter are hereby ordered to refrain from doing anything or causing 
any action which may affect, encumber or otherwise diminish the value of the property located on 
Canyon Road, Provo, Utah. 
3. It is hereby ordered that the parties shall maintain the status quo during the pendency 
of the appeal. The LeFevres are hereby ordered to maintain the property in the same or similar 
condition of its current state, and shall cause no diminution in value of the property because of a 
failure to maintain said property. 
4. The Stouts shall also file with this Court a bond in the amount of $20,000.00 which 
shall be submitted to this Court on or before March 14,2008, at 5:00 p.m. The bond may be a cash, 
corporate or surety bond at the choosing of the Stouts. 
5. The Stouts shall also be required to maintain homeowners and fire insurance on the 
property at a value set of $200,000.00. 
DATED this UO day of March, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
GARY D. £JOTT -
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STM^N QtffiSE^BERRY, for: 
-'MX, JOHNStn^& SCHMUTZ 
Attorneys for LeFevres 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this I* day of March, 2008. 
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq. 
Kirsti H. Hansen, Esq. 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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